



The civilian-military balance: Why institutional relations in
India and Pakistan are different
Aditya Sondhi explains the nature of relations between India’s civilian and military authorities and explains why
Pakistan’s experience has been drastically different.  
Q. You have drawn the distinction between armies that are loyal to governments of the day and those
that serve the country. Why is this distinction useful when considering the civilian-military balance in
South Asian countries?
A. Often, young South Asian countries find themselves in the midst of multiple power centres, all grappling for
political space (Thailand is a classic example from South-East Asia). The army in these situations finds itself
torn between serving the de facto government in power and the larger interests of the nation. The question that
Lieutenant General S.K. Sinha pithily asks in his autobiography is: “a soldier owes allegiance to the constitution,
but when he sees that constitution being systematically being destroyed, should he remain a silent spectator?”
The army is not competent or entitled to ask or answer these questions. But the moment it does, regardless of
the good intentions that may be involved, liberal democracy is the casualty. The army becomes a political player
and vitiates the balance of power.
Q. What has kept the Indian civilian-military balance in check? Is this an attribute of individuals in the
armed forces or the institutions?
A. A great deal of credit for the healthy civilian-military relations in India must go to the early generals, who were
trained in the highest traditions of the British army to be professional soldiers. No more and no less. King George
IV exempted his officers from drinking to his health or standing for the national anthem, as their loyalty could
never be in doubt. This ethos has carried the Indian army forth, making it remain loyal to the civilian leadership
of the day. But I must caveat here that the early generals of the Pakistan army were also from the same stock
and no less professional. But the fact that they were given a taste of political power early coupled with the
absence of other alternatives presented a fait accompli in Pakistan’s history.
Q. You have argued that the vacuum of strong civilian leaders in Pakistan in the years after Partition
explains the military’s interventionist role in the country. Is this the main difference between the
Pakistani and Indian trajectories in the context of the civilian-military balance?
A. I think this is the strongest reason for the nature of civil-military relations in the two countries. Pakistan had
her constitution after a lapse of close to six years, by which time her tallest leader, Jinnah, had passed away and
power was vested in bureaucrats. The people had no direct say in governance and the future of their young
country. This is a delicate phase in the making of the DNA of any country, and the absence of strong, democratic
leaders led to the military being seen as the only institution that was sincere and nationalistic. The fatal error
came from Prime Minister Nazimuddin who invited the army under General Ayub Khan to quell sectarian riots in
the Punjab province, permitting the army to dominate the political high table of its nation. India not only had
strong civilian leaders at her birth with a leaning toward democratic practices, but also leaders who distrusted the
army and saw it as a remnant of the Raj that had not involved itself in the freedom movement. The army has
therefore been not ‘politically relevant’ since India’s inception.
Q. Is the relationship between India’s armed forces and its civilian authorities defined more by past
engagements with Pakistan or China?
A. A bit of both. India’s 1962 war with China revealed the breakdown in leadership and the yawning trust-deficit
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between generals and the political class. It is to the credit of both that the ignominy of the war led to much soul-
searching. The phase thereafter led to improved transparency between the civilian and military leadership and
an emphasis on the indigenous growth of defence industries. The 1965 war with Pakistan quickly proved how
much things had improved, while the conflict in 1971 clinched the situation—this was a war during which
ministers listened to their chiefs and did not impose their will. The DGMO General Gill recalls how he often
walked out of meetings with the prime minister and the Raksha Mantri due to “the incessant chatter”. This was
taken on the chin and civilian-military relations became healthier than ever before.
Q. What role have courts played in India and Pakistan in establishing the civilian-military balance?
A. The courts have been seminal in both countries, for contrasting reasons. The Supreme Court in India has
become her most powerful organ, and determines the scope of parliamentary power. It decides the basic
structure of the constitution and binds the government and the people to it. This has checked despotism and
adventurism by any other organ of the state. More importantly, it has given the country a ‘last-word institution’
and has ruled out the possibility of the army being that institution The army now needs to look no further than the
orders of the Supreme Court to decide what is constitutionally legitimate.
In Pakistan, the Supreme Court has actually enabled military rule by upholding martial law on the doctrine of
necessity despite there being no express provision for it in the constitution. The army has developed with such
lopsided political power that there is really no check on those powers now. Though civil society in Pakistan is now
vigorously questioning the army’s role in the political spectrum, a stronger Supreme Court could have reined in
its powers much earlier and to greater avail. In some ways, the army is the ‘last-word institution’ in Pakistan. It
decides national priorities and the character of national interest. Other institutions seemingly toe the line.
Q. What impact has the role of the military and paramilitary forces in Kashmir had on the civilian-military
balance in India?
A. Marginal, really. This is because Kashmir is not the final frontier of relations with Pakistan for India, though it
appears to determine the way Pakistan relates to her neighbour. By this I mean that the army (in Pakistan) plays
up the issue of Kashmir to keep itself relevant in public perception. For Indians, the presence of the military in
Kashmir is viewed in two ways: one, as a trained force doing its job and with no other political ramifications; and
two, as a potential human rights dilemma that needs to be addressed.
Q. India has emerged as a major arms importer in recent years. What challenges does this era of rapid
militarisation pose to India’s civilian-military balance?
A. Ironically, the armed forces in India are well behind their optimal strength in terms of arms and resources. For
procurements, they remain dependent on the defence ministry, which is not necessarily proactive in such
matters. We must also notice the difference here between militarisation and praetorianism. Fortunately, the
former does not automatically lead to the latter (at least in India) and the military remains obedient to its political
masters.
Q. Are there any examples of the Indian armed forces engaging in political adventurism? What lessons
can India draw from these?
A. There are no such examples. I have argued, to the credit of the army, that despite several prevalent situations
where other armies would have acted up, the Indian army has remained impassive. These instances include the
breakdown in relations between the defence minister and the army chief in 1958-59, the Emergency of 1977, the
1962 war, Operation Blue Star, and the Indian Peace Keeping Force’s stint in Sri Lanka, where the army was
shoved into a skewed operation. By remaining politically passive during these critical phases, the army has
actually enabled democratic spaces to grow and be filled by other representative civilian institutions.
Q. How do the Indian armed forces manage linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity and what
implications does this have for Indian secularism more broadly?
A. The Indian armed forces are a melting pot of cultures and communities. A mix of races find themselves
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working and fighting together. The regimental izzat (honour) overrides all other considerations. This makes for a
truly secular organisation that remains a torchbearer for the rest of the country. I have repeatedly argued that this
attribute of the army should make it far more socially relevant to the rest of the nation than it is today.
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